

# **Public consultation on the Joint EU-Africa Strategy**

**Final report of the Conference on Civil  
Society and the Joint EU-Africa Strategy  
Bad Honnef, Germany, 23-24 April 2007**



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## Disclaimer

*This report has been prepared on the basis of the discussions at the Conference. The opinions expressed are those of the individual participants as recorded by ECDPM and the Conference Rapporteurs, and do not represent the official views of the European Union, the African Union or ECDPM.*

## Acronyms

APF	African Peace Facility
APRODEV	Association of World Council of Churches Related Development Organisations in Europe
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
CONCORD	The European NGO confederation for relief and development
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EC	European Commission
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EDF	European Development Fund
ENDA	Environmental Development Action in the Third World
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EU	European Union
FEMNET	The African Women's Development and Communication Network
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PELUM	Participatory Ecological Land-Use Management
UN	United Nations
VENRO	The Association of German development NGOs

# 1 Introduction

For the first time, the African Union and the European Union have decided to develop a 'Joint Strategy' which reflects the needs and aspirations of the peoples of both Africa and Europe. The purpose of this Joint Strategy is to develop a common political vision for the future partnership between the EU and Africa, based on mutual respect, common interests and the principle of ownership. The Joint Strategy is expected to be adopted at the planned EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon, in late 2007.

Leading up to the Summit, AU and EU institutions are organising a broad-based public debate that will generate ideas and suggestions from a large diversity of state and non-state actors. For this public consultation process the African Union and the European Union have invited the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) as an independent facilitator. As such, ECDPM's tasks are to encourage participation, liaise with all the interested parties, and feed in ideas and information. It strives to help push forward the discussion by summarising ideas brought forward, stimulating debate and introducing new angles and issues. The process is supported by the Finnish and German EU presidencies of 2006 and 2007, the European Commission and the African Union Commission.

The first phase of the public consultation ran from early February until May 2007, and took place both through an Internet consultation ([www.europafrika.org](http://www.europafrika.org) / [www.europafrique.org](http://www.europafrique.org)) and various events organised on the two continents. Throughout the consultation, outcomes were shared with officials from the AU and the EU. The final results of this first phase of the public consultation will be presented by mid-May 2007.

As the final step of the first phase of the public consultation, ECDPM organised a Conference on Civil Society and the Joint EU-Africa Strategy in cooperation with VENRO, the Association of German development NGOs. The Conference, which was held on 23 and 24 April 2007 in Bad Honnef, was attended by 104 participants and built on the topics raised in the internet consultation as well as in the institutional negotiations. It allowed African and European Civil Society actors to formulate expectations vis-à-vis the EU and the AU regarding the contents of the EU-Africa Joint Strategy and their role in it. Key messages and recommendations were identified and communicated to the official negotiators.

This report presents the main results of the Conference. First, the field of participants is explained. Next, the key overall messages of the Conference are presented. Finally, the structure of the Conference is discussed and the outcomes of the various Sessions are reported in depth.

## 2 Participants

The organisers aimed to achieve **balanced participation** in three dimensions: between European and African organisations; between the main thematic clusters (i.e. governance, development, trade, and peace and security); and finally between the various types of stakeholders. Invitations were sent to European Civil Society umbrella organisations and networks, as well as their African partners and counterparts. VENRO also invited its member organisations. In order to achieve a balanced mix of stakeholder participants, invitations were sent to other actors such as trade unions, research institutes and think tanks, the private sector, local government associations, diaspora organisations and women's and youth networks. Additionally, the Steering Committee that was established at the Civil Society consultation in Accra was invited to send a representation. Finally, officials from the African Union Commission and Member States as well as the European Commission and European Union Member States received an invitation.

In total, the conference brought together **104 representatives** of Civil Society Organisations and other stakeholders. There were 39 African participants, of which 21 came from Civil Society Organisations and 14 represented other organisations such as trade unions and research networks. 4 African participants were officials from the African Union Commission and Member States. 65 Participants came from Europe, with 36 of them representing Civil Society Organisations. 18 Europeans were from other organisations, and 11 officials from the European Commission and EU Member States were present at the Conference.

The list of participants can be downloaded from:

[http://europafrika.files.wordpress.com/2007/04/tn\\_liste200407fin.pdf](http://europafrika.files.wordpress.com/2007/04/tn_liste200407fin.pdf)

### 3 Key Messages of the Conference

*This is the organiser's elaborated summary of key points emerging from the Conference that was attended by over 70 Civil Society Actors from Africa and Europe. The aim of the Conference was to discuss and exchange ideas on the Joint EU-Africa Strategy rather than to arrive at a formal declaration, as the participants present felt that they did not have a mandate to endorse statements on behalf of Civil Society. A synthesis of the Key Messages was presented to the EU-Africa Expert Meeting that took place in Brussels on 26-28 April 2007: <http://europafrika.files.wordpress.com/2007/05/bad-honnef-key-message-final.doc>*

#### **Preamble**

Although the debates were rich, they seemed to provoke **more questions than answers**. A general lack of understanding among civil society actors was noted on the expected impact on the ground of the future Joint Strategy. Uncertainty also surrounded the proposed relationship between the Joint Strategy and existing partnerships and instruments of cooperation and political dialogue between the EU and Africa, and whether the Joint Strategy would merely integrate these or result in new initiatives. A related point of contention was the true value-added of a Joint Strategy beyond the support it provided for the principle of '*treating Africa as one*'.

Despite this background, strong agreement emerged on **principles and values**. In developing a Joint Strategy, there is a need to recognise the historical legacy of unequal relations between Africa and Europe, the most recent incarnation of which is that of recipient and donor. The Joint Strategy needs to address a partnership and participatory approach between Africa and the EU as well as the political level and Civil Society. Participants called for a new people-centred and people-driven partnership based on a set of shared principles, including mutual accountability, democracy, trust, justice, the rule of law, equality, citizenship, ownership, gender awareness and sustainability.

The **potential added value** of a Joint Strategy could reside in the opportunity it provides to better integrate various sector-based agreements. It could allow moving away from a fragmented relationship and towards bringing different strands together. A Joint Strategy might also reflect better the recent changes and developments in both Unions and their interest in jointly tackling problems at a global level. A Joint Strategy could further be beneficial to the peoples of both continents, provided it gives them a strong voice. Finally, it may lead to the creation of a more structured framework to systematically involve Civil Society in the official relations between the two continents

Considerable **scepticism** was also voiced. There is a real danger that the Joint Strategy could

be 'just another strategy paper'. Will it genuinely improve the coherence of EU policies towards Africa and for development? Moreover, will the Strategy process also integrate critical voices? Will it change other critical debates where the EU is currently not listening to Africa, such as over EPAs? Finally, would a Joint Strategy take account of African debates and diverging views, for instance on the negative effects of neo-liberalism, or would it simply reinforce the ascendance of market liberalism?

A lot of work remains to be done in order to arrive at common Civil Society positions on many of the questions raised above.

### ***Process and role of Civil Society***

Concerns were expressed about the **short timeline and the process** leading to a Joint EU-Africa Strategy. In order to have a meaningful consultation, there must be a transparent process with clarity on such questions as: Who decides on participation and outcomes? What is the timing of the process? When inputs can be made, and to whom? How will inputs be taken into account? Participants took note of the reasons why the draft outline had not been distributed and expressed regrets regarding this decision since it would have allowed for a more focussed contribution. Making the outline public after the Ministerial meeting in May would provide a new opportunity for more focussed comments. Participants took note that the consultation would continue after May.

There was appreciation for the number of African participants at the Conference. For a genuine EU-Africa partnership **all types of actors should be involved** in the consultation. Women's organisations, youth and diaspora should participate on an equal footing. There is still a need to convince many of the Civil Society Organisations that serious engagement in the formulation process is worth spending their limited resources on. In this context, financial support for full participation of Civil Society in Europe and Africa would be desirable.

Participants felt that the Lisbon Summit should be seen as one further milestone in the Joint Strategy process rather than an end in itself, and the question of **what happens after the Summit** should be addressed. Reflection is needed on the appropriate mechanisms to monitor implementation. More decentralised accountability mechanisms should be put in place. Monitoring would be easier if there was an action plan with indicators, and the official monitoring process should be accompanied by civil society monitoring. Independent spaces should be created for civil society dialogue and monitoring.

There were substantial discussions about the **follow-up options for Civil Society**. Participants should use their networks to inform their constituencies about the Joint Strategy process. Global fora and existing thematic networks must be used to inform and disseminate relevant

information and discuss the process, progress and objectives of the Joint Strategy. There is a need to map open, decentralised and autonomous civil society initiatives concerning the Joint Strategy. Taking a sector-based approach may be more manageable in this context. Although an appropriate space is needed for African, European and joint Euro-African civil society discussions, meetings with officials remain of vital importance. Concerning the monitoring work, using scheduled events and active networks (who does what?) would be useful. Finally, the African caucus met after the formal closing of the Conference in order to discuss possibilities for cooperation, coordination and follow-up.

- ***‘There is a need to move from consultation to involvement’***
- ***‘We are not endorsing a strategy that we do not know’***

## ***Key points from Thematic Working Group Reports***

### **I. Governance, Democracy & Human Rights**

- *Governance Agenda*: every country must decide its own governance agenda, which should come from its grassroots. A bottom-up approach is needed in order to re-establish the state from the local level (participation of civil society, local authorities, media, parliaments, women, young people, etc). There is no appetite for a single agenda imposed from outside. At the same time some general principles should be adhered to, e.g. transparency and mutual accountability.
- *Mutual Accountability*: conditionality is acceptable but it must be agreed upon and shared, instead of imposed unilaterally. Europe must also be held accountable so that aid becomes more effective, more transparent, better coordinated and coherent. There should be no double standards. For example, Europe’s position towards Africa should not be different from its position towards China, and neither should it differ from the standards Europe maintains internally.
- *Enforcement*: We must find a mechanism that guarantees that mutual commitments are respected. This must happen through regular and inclusive dialogue, which goes beyond formal dialogue and which includes the participation of civil society.

### **II. Key Development Issues**

- Participants did not agree with the neo-liberal development model and called on the EU and AU in their Joint Strategy to recognise and recommit to following key principles which are already part of our existing international commitments, such as:
  - Human Rights and the Right to Development.
  - Justice – including in the economic sense, on debt, the environment, etc.
  - Ownership – including ownership based on the autonomy of national and local

- governments and civil society and grassroots movements.
- Equality and particularly gender equality.
- Human Security – including physical security, food security, etc.
- Pro-poor, people-focussed development.
- Policy space for African governments and civil societies.
- Important key development issues for the Joint Strategy which were identified by the group, but which require further debate, include:
  - ODA, debt and aid effectiveness.
  - Human and social development, including education and health for all, HIV/AIDS, access for vulnerable groups and achievement of the MDGs.
  - Environmental sustainability and climate change.
  - Migration.

### **III. Trade & Regional Integration**

- The group recognised the rationale for and potential value added of the EU-Africa Strategy for trade and regional integration.
- Trade agreements should have a clear development dimension.
- The impact of EU agricultural policies on African agriculture and rural populations should be taken into account.
- Policy coherence must be ensured between the EU-Africa Strategy, EU development policies, trade agreements and other EU policies with external impacts.
- An on-going policy dialogue must be established between the EU and Africa – in that sense the Joint Strategy should be seen as a means to this end.
- Africa's own integration process, that is the Abuja Treaty (AEC) process, has to be respected.

### **IV. Peace & Security**

- Peace and security based on human security require a sustained, holistic approach encompassing crisis management, long term peace building, development conflict prevention and governance.
- Predictable funds are needed with easier access for civil society. In addition to development funding there should be separate financial support for peace keeping operations.
- On-going dialogue with civil society on peace and security is essential and specific structures and mechanisms should be enshrined in the Strategy, particularly with regard to early warning and early action.
- Capacity building should reinforce existing structures with particular emphasis on civilian capabilities in peace and security. It is important that peace building and conflict prevention activities be carried out by permanent professional staff.

## 4 Structure of the Conference

The Conference was structured along five sessions over the two days. They are briefly explained here, and discussed in more detail below. The programme of the Conference can be found in Annex I. Plenary **Session 1** on Day I started with the context of and expectations from the Conference as laid out in opening addresses by ECDPM, VENRO and the intervention by Ewah Eleri of the International Centre for Energy, Environment & Development. The progress of the official EU-Africa negotiations was explained by the EU and AU Presidencies. At the end of Session 1, ECDPM proposed an overall methodology for the Conference.

Plenary **Session 2** was structured around the added value of the Joint Strategy. It started with the presentation of the outcomes of the internet consultation by ECDPM, and the outcomes of the African Civil Society Forum by a member of the Accra Steering Committee. A panel discussion with officials and Civil Society representatives from Africa and Europe then took place, discussing the need for a Joint Strategy, the limitations of the present EU-Africa relationship, and ways in which this relationship should be improved.

**Session 3** saw 4 parallel Working Groups meeting to discuss Civil Society and the Joint Strategy. The role of Civil Society in the both preparation of the Joint Strategy and its implementation and monitoring were discussed. Rapporteurs from the Working Groups presented and discussed their observed key messages in the following plenary meeting.

On Day II, **Session 4** again was dedicated to Working Group discussions, this time concerning the content of the Joint Strategy. Each of the four Working Groups discussed one thematic cluster (Governance, Democracy and Human Rights; Key Development Issues; Trade and Regional Integration; and Peace and Security). Rapporteurs again presented and discussed their observed key messages in the plenary meeting following the Working Group sessions.

Finally, plenary **Session 5** addressed the road to the Lisbon Summit and beyond. The two Conference rapporteurs presented and discussed their perceived overall key messages emerging from the entire Conference. This was followed by a plenary discussion. Several Civil Society representatives then presented their views on the Conference's main outcomes in a panel discussion. Key AU and EU officials were invited to share their views on the key messages and outcomes in the following plenary discussion. ECDPM and VENRO closed the Conference.

After the formal closing of the Conference, the African caucus met separately to discuss the possibilities for cooperation, coordination and follow-up.

## **Session 1: Opening**

The Conference started with welcome and introductory remarks by **Paul Engel**, director of ECDPM. He explained the purpose of the Conference was to discuss EU civil society views in relation to the proposed Joint EU-Africa Strategy being drafted in the run-up to the Lisbon Summit. Paul Engel also mentioned both the official and the public consultation processes, explaining that this Conference should be seen as merely one moment along the path towards the preparation, drafting and implementation of the Joint Strategy.

**Michael Steeb**, member of VENRO's Steering Group of the EU Presidency Project "Prospects for Africa – Europe's policies", acknowledged in his opening remarks that the public consultation process had caused controversial discussions among NGOs. While VENRO shares their concerns, it decided to cooperate in the organisation of this Conference particularly to give African organisations a voice.

**Ewah Eleri** of the International Centre for Energy, Environment & Development pointed out the need for a "reality check" for the EU-Africa relationship. Many parameters have changed, only some of which can be influenced. In particular, Mr Eleri mentioned environmental challenges, migration, and the rise of other powers which ensures that Europe can no longer take Africa for granted. There is a need for a new strategy that fully takes into account these dramatic changes. In the search for appropriate policy tools, one must go beyond the traditional focus on aid and trade and pay special attention to governance. Africa should be able to set priorities. Mr Eleri's expectations of the Conference included a clear and shared civil society vision on EU-Africa relations and a view on how civil society's deliberations can ensure mutual accountability. Finally, this could be the beginning of a real engagement between European and African civil society.

After the opening remarks, EU and AU representatives discussed the progress of the official negotiations. **Klaus Zillikens** of the German EU Presidency's Federal Foreign Office spoke about the state of affairs from a European viewpoint. He mentioned that a draft outline of the Joint Strategy had been prepared, containing 39 priorities. These were not organised on the basis of thematic clusters, but rather according to their scope: policies affecting both Europe and Africa (e.g. migration); policies with an African focus (e.g. development); policies at a global level (e.g. climate change) and finally policies involving, empowering and articulating the Civil Societies of both continents. Mr Zillikens concluded by saying that the outreach to Civil Society is a crucial part of the negotiation process, and will continue until the Lisbon Summit. The EU negotiators look forward to the input of Civil Society Actors and have already studied the comments and suggestions made during the internet consultation. Mr Zillikens' address is included fully in Annex II.

On behalf of the Ghanaian AU Presidency, **H.E. Nena Berna Kumi**, Ambassador of Ghana to the European Union, started by referring to the EU Strategy for Africa and the ensuing desire of African partners to co-own a comprehensive and coherent EU-Africa Strategy. The Joint Strategy is expected to provide a framework for a new phase in the EU-Africa partnership. The objective is to create a political partnership to find solutions of common interest to the parties. The traditional aid-recipient partnership therefore needs to be transcended and replaced with a partnership based on values such as equality, justice and mutual accountability.

After the opening addresses above, several **questions** were asked by the floor. A recurring question was how to ensure coherency and consistency between existing and new strategies and implementation plans. Klaus Zillikens mentioned that while coherency and consistency are important, there is also a need for the Joint Strategy negotiations to move forward. H.E. Mahamet Annadif, ambassador of the African Union Commission, stated that the long-term Joint Strategy should learn from the incoherencies of earlier agreements.

At the end of Session 1 **James Mackie** of ECDPM briefly explained the Conference methodology.

### ***Session 2: Added value of the Joint Strategy***

Chaired by Geert Laporte of ECDPM, this session started with the presentations of the outcomes of the internet consultation and the African Civil Society Forum organised in Accra on 26-28 March 2007. **Marie-Laure de Bergh** of ECDPM presented the main outcomes of the internet consultation that ECDPM facilitated through its website [www.europafrique.org](http://www.europafrique.org) (English) / [www.europafrique.org](http://www.europafrique.org) (French). The full report of this internet consultation is available online at [http://europafrique.files.wordpress.com/2007/04/draft-report-22-04-07\\_final.doc](http://europafrique.files.wordpress.com/2007/04/draft-report-22-04-07_final.doc)

Next, **Roselynn Musa** of FEMNET and member of the Accra Steering Committee presented the key outcomes of the African Civil Society Forum. She stressed the need for priorities to originate from Africa. One cannot discuss improving people's situations in their absence. The full report of the African Civil Society Forum is available online at <http://europafrique.files.wordpress.com/2007/04/accra-report.pdf>

H.E. **Mahamet Annadif** drew attention to the changes that have created a new face for Africa in recent years. The AU and NEPAD are two important examples; however, the continent so far has not always been successfully united. The Joint Strategy is intended to benefit the populations of Africa and Europe, and the role of Civil Society is to act as advocates for those who are voiceless: their inputs must be used in the Joint Strategy process. Lisbon should not be seen as an end in itself, since there is a continuous need to reflect on the EU-Africa partnership.

**Philippe Darmuzey** of the European Commission first explained the rationale behind the long-term strategic partnership, which started as a unilateral process in 2005. The intention is not simply to validate this process, but instead to integrate all relevant actors. The Joint Strategy will help to maintain Africa on the European agenda, but it must be owned by Africa as well. A strategic partnership would permit an approach towards consensus between the two continents as a whole.

Addressing the value added of the Joint Strategy, Mr Darmuzey mentioned the change from a relationship between fragmented actors towards increased unity on both sides at all levels. The basis provided by mutual respect, independence and interdependence will help to transform the donor-recipient relationship into a genuine political partnership. The new partnership will enable Africa and Europe to jointly address global challenges such as migration, environmental sustainability, globalisation and terrorism. Finally, there is value added in creating a people-centred partnership which requires participation from all levels of Civil Society.

Representing APRODEV and CONCORD, **Rob van Drimmelen** welcomed the sincere effort to include Civil Society in the Joint Strategy process. Nevertheless, the consultation process can be improved and should continue after Lisbon, which should be seen as a milestone. The Joint Strategy is a welcome and absolutely necessary addition to the EU Strategy for Africa. It should be genuinely co-owned and it must demonstrate commitment to development, democracy and human rights. The involvement of African partners in the process is vital. Importantly, the Joint Strategy will depend on trust at all levels for its effectiveness as a partnership. This will require time and effort. Monitoring of the Strategy's implementation is essential and should be addressed at this stage.

**Taoufik Ben Abdallah** of ENDA Tiers Monde stated that the objective of the Joint Strategy is unclear. How should the relationship with other, existing strategies be coordinated? Africa needs to take a stand, but its unity is limited. The question is whether a Joint Strategy will be beneficial for African unity or not. Mr Ben Abdallah also called into question the transparency of the Joint Strategy agenda, noting that current issues rather than the wish for a long-term partnership seem to have propelled the Joint Strategy to the fore.

Mr Ben Abdallah further argued that participation in the Joint Strategy must include the populations of Europe and Africa directly and not be limited to Civil Society Organisations, especially since long-term issues are at stake. Civil Society must commit to identifying and collecting opinions about the main issues through relevant networks. Local governments must also be involved. The African Union has managed to tackle important issues, but it is not always clear whether it acts in the interest of the African population or in the interest of African states.

In response to Mr Ben Abdallah's comments, Mr Darmuzey argued that while transparency is important, a hidden agenda should not be readily assumed. The strategic partnership would have long-term regional development in mind, and would therefore not be solely concerned with short-term outcomes.

H.E. Mahamet Annadif commented on the legitimacy of the African Union. He pointed out the positive evolutions taking place in Africa, with almost half of African countries on their way towards becoming democracies. Nevertheless, bottlenecks continue to exist. The EU and Civil Society can contribute to democratisation in Africa. Parliaments and unions are also of crucial importance. A united Africa, as desired by the EU, would also be in Africa's own interest.

The **discussion with the floor** brought to surface a number of issues. Geert Laporte, the chair of Session 2, noted two diverging views: one stresses that "things are moving in Africa", while the other insists on looking at reality on the ground and issues of transparency: which issues are put on the table and which are not?

One participant noted that several large movements within African Civil Society were not represented at this Conference, nor for instance in the Accra Steering Group. It was also mentioned that African migrants in European countries should be mobilised and engaged.

Critical comments were aimed at the perceived lack of difference between the EU Strategy for Africa and the proposed Joint EU-Africa Strategy. This creates the impression that the EU has already fixed its views and merely wants others to adopt them as well, rather than working towards genuine partnership. This would prevent priorities and perspectives of the African and European populations from being taken into account.

Questions were also raised about the nexus between the Joint Strategies and existing agreements, particularly Cotonou. Which inefficiencies of these existing agreements will the Joint Strategy address, and what kind of harmonisation will take place? Mr Darmuzey responded by stating he saw no incompatibilities between Cotonou and the Joint EU-Africa Strategy. Existing frameworks are therefore not put into question, but the Joint Strategy will be able to complement them.

The Session was ended with a brief introduction by Marie-Laure de Bergh of ECDPM concerning the Working Groups during Session 3.

### ***Session 3: Civil Society and the Joint Strategy***

Four parallel Working Groups were formed, each discussing the same main questions which can be divided into two categories. The first set of questions addressed the **role of Civil Society in the preparation of the Joint Strategy**. The second set of questions concerned **implementation and monitoring of the future Joint Strategy**, and the place of Civil Society therein. The full set of guiding questions can be found in Annex III.

During the plenary part of Session 3, chaired by James Mackie of ECDPM, rapporteurs from each Working Group presented a limited number of key issues that emerged from the discussions. It was felt that participants should use their networks to inform their constituencies about the Joint Strategy process. Participants also pointed out the need to convince many of the Civil Society Organisations that serious engagement in the formulation process is worth spending their limited resources on. Concern was expressed about the short timeline and the transparency of the process leading to a Joint EU-Africa Strategy. In order to have a meaningful consultation, clarity is needed on such questions as: who decides on participation and outcomes? When can inputs be made, and to whom? And how will these inputs be taken into account?

Further, participants recognised the need for reflection on the appropriate mechanisms to monitor implementation, which would be greatly facilitated by an action plan and adequate indicators. The official monitoring process should be accompanied by Civil Society monitoring. More decentralised accountability mechanisms should be put in place.

Participants also called for the draft outline of the Joint Strategy to be made public as soon as possible, so that an opportunity would be provided for more focused comments. They took note of the reasons why the draft outline had not been distributed so far, and expressed regrets regarding this decision.

The reports of the Working Groups are included in Annex IV. They are also synthesised in Chapter 3 of this report, which contains the key messages of the Conference.

### ***Session 4: The content of the Joint Strategy***

Working Groups were also formed during Session 4. However, unlike the previous Session, each Working Group focused on a specific thematic cluster pertaining to the Joint Strategy. Working Group I discussed Governance, Democracy and Human Rights. Working Group II addressed Key Development Issues. Working Group III was concerned with Trade and Regional Integration. Working Group IV was structured around issues of Peace and Security.

After the Working Group discussions, the main outcomes of each Group were once again presented by rapporteurs during a plenary panel discussion chaired by Christa Randzio-Plath of VENRO.

The full set of guiding questions for the Working Groups can be found in Annex V. The reports of the Working Groups are included in Annex VI. A selection of main issues emerging from each Working Group is also presented in Chapter 3 of this report, which contains the key messages of the Conference.

### ***Session 5: The road to Lisbon and beyond***

The closing Session, chaired by James Mackie and Geert Laporte of ECDPM, started with the presentation of the overall Conference conclusions by the two Conference rapporteurs. **Hussaini Abdu** of Action Aid Africa noted that the debates had been rich, although they seemed to raise more questions than answers. Some of these have an existential character: what would be the added value of the Joint Strategy? And how would it relate to other, existing agreements?

Mr Abdu also saw mutual accountability between Civil Society and governments as a key issue. Civil Society needs to be strengthened and given a strategic role in the Joint Strategy, ensuring equality, trust and transparency of the process. Furthermore, the Joint Strategy must change the current donor-recipient relationship between the European Union and Africa. In this context, there are concerns that the current process is still too much driven by the European Union. Full equality will be difficult to attain, since substantial funding will still flow from the European Union to Africa. Nevertheless, the Lisbon Summit should mark the beginning of a genuine partnership.

Conference rapporteur **Sven Harmeling** of German Watch added that the Joint Strategy should be based on the fundamental principles of equal partnership, mutual accountability and respect, ownership by governments and ownership by the people. Mr Harmeling saw several opportunities provided by a Joint Strategy: improved integration of existing yet currently fragmented agreements and strategies between the EU and Africa, a new basis for cooperation, and the building of trust and partnership at different levels. Moreover, the Joint Strategy could give people a voice.

Concerning difficulties facing the Joint Strategy, Mr Harmeling pointed out the possibility of it becoming 'just another' strategy paper. Furthermore, 'hard' policies such as the EPAs seem to be developing at a much faster rate than the Joint Strategy. Civil Society Organisations may therefore decide that this process is not worth spending their limited resources on. Finally, there are still many incoherencies within the EU that need to be overcome.

Concerning the Joint Strategy **process**, the rapporteurs agreed that broader participation is needed and that the move has to be made **from consultation to involvement**. Discussions on content need to continue: the dissemination of a draft outline of the Joint Strategy would help to focus discussions. Finally, the Lisbon Summit should be seen as a milestone and there is a need for a clear framework for monitoring.

Several important issues were mentioned during the plenary discussion following the presentations by the Conference rapporteurs. The key messages emerging from the Conference were not politically endorsed, as participants felt they did not have a mandate to do so. Transparency from the official side is needed in order to enable meaningful participation by non-state actors. What decisions are taken, and to whom can comments be addressed? The creation of an action plan and sector-specific approaches would facilitate monitoring, which needs to be done both by governments and by Civil Society. The latter has a responsibility to bring the public consultation down to the national levels.

The Conference key messages were highlighted by **Joseph Ssuunna** of PELUM Association, **Christa Randzio-Plath** of VENRO, and **Roselynn Musa** of FEMNET. They stressed the vital importance of mutual ownership and accountability, the end to paternalistic approaches, and the need to move from consultation to involvement. After the promises that were made to Africa in 2005, the question of implementation becomes ever more pressing. It was strongly felt that Civil Society Organisations cannot not endorse a strategy that they do not know.

Finally, an interactive panel discussion took place. **Thomas Albert**, Director for Africa and the Middle East at the Federal Ministry for Development of Germany, stated that the ideas emerging from the conferences to a large extent overlap with the ideas of the German EU Presidency. Cooperation with and a critical response from Civil Society are needed. They started with this very Conference and will hopefully be continued. Mr Albert noted that aid as such is no longer the simple answer to all of the challenges faced by Africa. There is a need to change paternalistic attitudes, which may have been stimulated by traditional aid patterns. Budget support may be one way of engagement on a more equal footing. Finally, investments must be made in Africa's own initiatives. The Joint Strategy should not substitute these initiatives, and the EU should exercise patience in this regard.

H.E. **Mahamet Annadif** considered it time that Europe starts treating Africa as one, which in itself would be an important change. This is a clear illustration of the need for a Joint Strategy. Civil Society has an important role to play as a motivator for change and an engine for development in each country. In response to a question from the floor, Mr Annadif recognised the important role of the African diaspora in Europe.

**João Gomes Cravinho**, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs & Cooperation of Portugal, also saw substantial overlap between the outcomes of this Conference and the official agenda. Areas where this overlap does not exist are largely those on which there are still diverging views within the EU, Africa and Civil Society. A new platform for political dialogue between the EU and Africa as equals is needed. The Lisbon Summit would be one milestone in this process. He acknowledged that dialogue with Civil Society had been insufficient in certain respects, and recognised the crucial need for permanent dialogue including other stakeholders as well. Mr Cravinho called for Civil Society to think of ways in which such a structured and permanent dialogue could take place. There is scope for initiatives, as ‘the map is drawn as we make the journey’.

**Klaus Rudischhauser**, Director for General Affairs at the Directorate General for Development of the European Commission, pointed out that the process is in its starting phase. This Conference should thus be viewed as a start rather than an end. He expressed the hope that Civil Society Organisations would mobilise their constituencies to become involved in the Joint Strategy. It is too early to assess the added value of the Joint Strategy, as this will only become clear when it is formulated. Concerning the relation with other agreements and strategies, the Joint Strategy will provide a platform for decision-making on a common basis. Mr Rudischhauser explained that the draft outline of the Joint Strategy could not yet be distributed, as it was still incomplete and was yet to be agreed upon. He mentioned the possibility of an event similar to this Conference after a more substantial outline would become public.

**Koen Vervaeke**, Head of the Africa Task Force at the Council Secretariat, argued that the EU Strategy for Africa reflected the recognition that the EU should become more effective in its approach towards Africa. The current process already shows the added value of the Joint Strategy by creating new forms of dialogue with the African Union. Nevertheless, multiple frameworks will continue to exist, reflecting the diverse reality of relations between the EU and Africa. The Lisbon Summit would mean a milestone that would mark mutual accountability, the identification and recognition of African commitments, and the adaptation of instruments to better suit African reality. Importantly, the Joint Strategy should not be reduced to questions of financing: a partnership on the political and global levels is needed.

# Annex I - Programme of the Conference

## Civil Society and the Joint EU-Africa Strategy

Bad Honnef, 23-24 April 2007

Venue: Katholisch Soziales Institut  
Selhofer Strasse 11, D-53604 Bad Honnef, Germany

Hosted by:  
ECDPM (European Centre for Development Policy Management)  
VENRO (Association of German Development NGOs)

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### Day I Shared vision and the overall process of the Joint Strategy

**09.45–10.30**      **Arrival and registration of participants**

#### Session 1: Opening

**Chair: Paul Engel, director of ECDPM**

**10.30–11.30**  
*(Forum III)*

#### **Plenary: opening remarks**

- Brief welcome and introduction to conference by Paul Engel
- Opening remarks by Michael Steeb, VENRO Steering Group of the EU Presidency Project Prospects for Africa – Europe's Policies
- Intervention by Ewah Eleri, International Centre for Energy, Environment & Development

#### **Plenary: progress of the official negotiations**

- EU Presidency:  
Klaus Zillikens, Federal Foreign Office
- AU Presidency:  
H.E. Ms. Nena Berna Kumi, Ambassador of Ghana

#### **Reactions from the floor**

#### **Conference methodology**

by James Mackie, ECDPM

**11.30–11.45**      **Coffee break**

## Session 2: Added value of the Joint Strategy

**Chair: Geert Laporte, ECDPM**

**11:45–13:30**  
*(Forum III)*

**Outcomes of the internet consultation**  
by Marie-Laure de Bergh, ECDPM

**Outcomes of the African Civil Society Forum organised on 26-28 March, Accra, Ghana**

by Roselynn Musa, FEMNET, on behalf of the Accra Steering Committee

**Plenary discussion: Why do we need a Joint Strategy? What are the limitations of the present EU-Africa relationship? How should the EU-Africa relationship be improved?**

- H.E. Mr. Mahamet Annadif  
African Union Commission
- Philippe Darmuzey  
European Commission
- Rob van Drimmelen  
CONCORD representative
- Taoufik Ben Abdallah  
Environmental Development Action in the Third World

**Plenary: introduction to the afternoon working groups**

**13.30–15:00**

**Lunch**

## Session 3: Civil Society and the Joint Strategy

**15.00–17:00**  
*(Forum I and III, Seminar rooms 4 and 5)*

**4 Parallel working groups (WG) all discuss:**

- **The role of Civil Society in the preparation of the Joint Strategy**
- **Implementation and monitoring of the future Joint Strategy: what place for Civil Society?**

**17:00–17:30**

**Coffee break**

**Chair: Jean Bossuyt, ECDPM**

**17.30–18.30**  
*(Forum III)*

**Plenary: interactive panel discussion with WG rapporteurs**

**19.00**

**Reception (Forum IV) / dinner at the restaurant**

## Day II Content and implementation of the Joint Strategy

### Session 4: The content of the Joint Strategy

Chair: Prof. Dr. h.c. Christa Randzio-Plath, VENRO

**09.00–09:15**  
(Forum III)

**Plenary: introduction to the working groups**

**09.15–12.00**  
(Forum I and  
III, seminar  
rooms 4 and  
5)

**4 Parallel working groups (WG):**

- WG I** *Governance, democracy and human rights*
- WG II** *Key development issues*
- WG III** *Trade and regional integration*
- WG IV** *Peace and security*

*Coffee break to be taken at working groups' discretion*

**12.00–13:00**  
(Forum III)

**Plenary: interactive panel discussion with WG rapporteurs**

**13.00–14.30**

**Lunch**

### Session 5: The road to Lisbon and beyond

Chair: James Mackie, ECDPM

**14:30–16:00**  
(Forum III)

**Presentation of the overall conference conclusions by conference rapporteurs:**

- Sven Harmeling  
German Watch
- Hussaini Abdu  
Action Aid Africa

**Plenary discussion: What are the key messages from the conference for the Joint EU-Africa Strategy? What role for Civil Society in the implementation and monitoring of the Joint Strategy?**

**Reactions from the floor**

**16:00–16:30**

**Coffee break**

**Chair: Geert Laporte, ECDPM**

**16:30–18:00**  
*(Forum III)*

**Presentation of the Conference key messages by civil society representatives:**

- Joseph Ssuuna  
PELUM Association
- Prof. Dr. h.c. Christa Randzio-Plath  
Vice-chair, VENRO
- Roselynn Musa, FEMNET  
on behalf of the Accra Steering Committee

**Plenary: interactive panel discussion with political leaders**

- Thomas Albert  
Director for Africa and the Middle East, Federal Ministry for Development, Germany
- H.E. Mr. Mahamet Annadif  
Ambassador of the African Union
- Prof. Dr. João Gomes Cravinho  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs & Cooperation of Portugal
- Klaus Rudischhauser  
Director for General Affairs, DG Development, European Commission
- Koen Vervaeke  
Head of the Africa Task Force, Council Secretariat

**18.00–18:15**  
*(Forum III)*

**Plenary: closing comments**

- ECDPM and VENRO conclude conference and explain follow-up

# Annex II - Progress of the Official Negotiations

Presentation by Klaus Zillikens, Counsellor, African Affairs, Federal Foreign Office

Civil Society and the Joint EU-Africa Strategy  
Bad Honnef, 23-24 April 2007

Ladies and Gentlemen, dear friends!

The mandate for the elaboration of a Joint EU-Africa Strategy dates back to the EU-Africa Ministerial Troika meeting on 2 December 2005. The Ministerial Troikas meet every 6 months; they guide and monitor the EU-Africa dialogue. At present the Troikas comprise the AU Commission and Ghana on the African side and the EU Commission, the Council Secretariat, Germany and Portugal on the European side.

The mandate of December 2005 was a political reaction to the EU-Africa Strategy adopted in the same month. Our African partners felt that as welcome as the EU-Africa Strategy was, it was a unilateral document, the elaboration of which had taken place without formal African involvement. Hence their wish, accepted by the EU at the time, to commission a Joint EU Africa Strategy.

At the following Ministerial Troika in Vienna, in May 2006, Ministers agreed not to jump start the Strategy negotiations, but to prepare them through an outline paper comprising the main elements of the Strategy. This approach was taken because it was felt that more clarity on what the Strategy should be and what it should deliver was needed, and also because Ministers felt that Member States involved on both sides, and also the Civil Societies should be given some time to reflect.

So that's the context of the EU-Africa outline discussions which have started last summer and which will hopefully be concluded in time for our next Ministerial Troika on 15 May in Brussels. Again, the negotiations on a the Strategy proper haven't started yet – we are still at a preliminary stage.

But nevertheless, discussions have made enormous progress over the last three months. After a brainstorming meeting in February this year, we have been able to put a draft outline on paper which could very well become the blueprint of the Strategy itself.

The draft outline is divided in four chapters:

The key chapter is chapter two ("Objectives and Strategies"). The present draft lists a total of 39 policy priorities in this chapter, covering all areas of EU-Africa cooperation. The policy priorities are not organised in the familiar, clusters based manner, which you all know (Peace and Security, Governance and Human Rights, Trade and Regional Integration, Development), but according to their scope, starting with policies that effect both Europe and Africa (e.g. migration), listing then policies with an African focus (mainly "classical" development issues), policies at a global level (e.g. climate change, terrorism) and finally policies involving, empowering and articulating the Civil Societies of both continents.

This innovative approach underlines that the Joint Strategy is meant to establish a true and comprehensive partnership between the EU and Africa, which would no longer be based on a donor-recipient relationship but establish a framework for cooperation on all policy levels relevant for both continents.

Chapter one of the outline contains language on the history of EU-Africa relations and on the principles that will guide our cooperation in future – the unity of Africa, the interdependence

between both continents, democratic principles and the rule of law being the most important ones.

Chapter three is listing a number of so-called “New Approaches”, which we will have to follow in our relationship, if we want to achieve the objectives set out in chapter two. It’s here where we emphasize the need to improve and broaden our dialogue, to enhance ODA levels and to align our political and legal frameworks, if necessary.

Chapter four finally talks about the various actors of our new partnership, specifically mentioning non-institutional actors. This represents a major step forward as compared e.g. to the EU-Africa Strategy. Chapter four also talks about the need to create effective implementation and monitoring instruments.

The question whether the Strategy shall comprise an Action Plan, has not been resolved yet, but Member States on both continents expect to see concrete deliverables in the Strategy, so it will have to be both – a political and an operational document.

As you are aware, the target date for approval of the Strategy is the second EU-Africa summit scheduled to take place in Lisbon in December this year. As regards the EU negotiation team, we are convinced that we will be able to meet this deadline. Next steps are the endorsement of the outline by the next Ministerial Troika in mid May and the start of the negotiations on the Strategy proper shortly thereafter.

I’d like to conclude by saying that the outreach to the African and European Civil Societies is a crucial part of our negotiation process and is supposed to continue until Lisbon. In the name of the whole EU negotiation team I can say that we are looking forward to the input of Civil Society actors and have already studied with interest the comments and suggestions made in the framework of the “internet consultation” which has started in February.

I’m of course ready to answer any questions you may have.

Thank you very much!

# **Annex III - Guiding Questions for Working Groups in Session 3 on Day I: Civil Society and the Joint Strategy**

**MONDAY 23 APRIL, 15:00 – 17:00**

## **The Role of Civil Society in the Preparation of the Joint Strategy**

- What expectations do Civil Society Organisations have on their role in the preparation of the Strategy and to what extent are these being met?
- Are there any major differences in needs and expectations from different parts of Civil Society that need to be catered for?
- What are the major threats and challenges for Civil Society in the preparation of the Joint Strategy?
- What are the opportunities to further influence the ongoing process, and how will Civil Society try to use these?

## **Implementation and monitoring of the future Joint Strategy: what place for Civil Society?**

- Do we need a dual approach in Africa and in the EU?
- What is expected from different stakeholders? Where can they make a difference and what different roles and tasks can be identified? Are there synergies to be achieved?
- How to strengthen democratic accountability (e.g. involvement of parliaments)?
- How might effective joint monitoring mechanisms be established in concrete institutional frameworks?

# Annex IV - Reports from Day I Session 3: Civil Society and the Joint Strategy

## **Key points from Working Group I in Session 3**

### **Rôle de la société civile**

- Nécessite de contextualiser les questions
- Importance de la société civile comme gage démocratique, faire remonter les préoccupations des citoyens par l'intermédiaire des associations de proximité
- Vision base sur la charte des droits fondamentaux
- Préoccupations intégrées dans la stratégie de lutte contre la pauvreté
- Légitimité de la société civile : articulation entre démocratie participative et représentative ,entre le social et l'institutionnel
- Grande diversité de la société civile, rôles différents en Afrique et en Europe

### **Comment la société civile peut-elle s'organiser ?**

- Mise en place des points focaux pays qui travailleraient de façon transversale avec une approche sectorielle pour mutualiser et relayer l'information
- Implication pluri-acteurs
- Renforcer le partenariat entre les sociétés civiles africaines et européennes et décloisonner les initiatives
- Comment capitaliser et articuler les résultats des différentes consultations ?

### **Relation entre la Stratégie conjointe et les autres accords**

- Quelle est la relation entre les différents processus de négociations : APEs , 10eme FED, Stratégie conjointe... ?
- Y a t'il un cadre juridique qui sous tend la stratégie conjointe ? Si non, quelle est la valeur ajoutée de la stratégie conjointe ?

### **Processus de négociation et de consultation**

- Calendrier trop court et doit être allongé
- Nécessité d'avoir accès au draft outline
- Clarification nécessaires sur le processus de prise de décision
- Quel cadre juridique pour encadrer les consultations de la société civile ?
- Etablissement de priorités consensuelles : programme minimum de priorités

### **Mise en œuvre**

- Nécessite de mecanismes de suivi et de relais de l'information a tous les niveaux (du local au continental)
- Probleme de la mise en œuvre : beaucoup d'engagements mais pas de suivi

## **Key points from Working Group II in Session 3**

### **The Role of Civil Society in the Preparation of the Joint Strategy**

1. CSOs have an expectation to be fully involved in this process of developing a Joint Strategy (JS), and not simply consulted. Consultation involves a formal procedural requirement of 'being asked'. Involvement, on the other hand, implies participation and ownership. CSOs should be involved from the design of the JS, through its entire implementation as well as access to any funds envisaged by the JS.
2. There were concerns about the representivity of CSOs. It is important that grassroots voices are heard and their concerns articulated, since these groups are often the most directly affected by policies. It is also important to build synergies between NGOs and social movements, and to empower the latter to meaningfully participate in the JS. The diaspora needs to be involved more strategically too.
3. There were concerns that the JS process may be ad hoc; a talk show that ends with Lisbon. We need to broaden the scope and depth of the process, and ensure that all issues are approached – but also ensure that they do not simply represent the lowest common denominator. It was suggested that the outcome document/statement of the conference should be posted on the internet, so that others may comment.
4. It must be recognised that CSOs in Europe and Africa are at different levels of development. In Africa, they are young and need to be strengthened and capacitated. It would be useful to do a mapping and scoping exercise of CSOs in Africa working on EU-Africa issues.

### **Implementation and monitoring of the future Joint Strategy: what place for Civil Society?**

1. There was uncertainty about what was implied by a 'dual approach'. It was agreed that there should be fundamental common principles, but CSOs in Europe and Africa have different roles and responsibilities. In terms of subsidiarity, different challenges should be addressed at different levels and by different actors.
2. Stakeholders clearly have different roles to play. Since we operate from different value systems, transforming people and societies is not an easy task.
3. There was some discussion about what is meant by 'democracy' and the fact that existing systems do not always deliver on expectations. We need to strengthen the roles of national, regional and pan-continental parliaments as well as local governments and communities in monitoring implementation of the JS.
4. We need to look at current processes that aren't working or are flawed, and learn from their deficiencies. Importantly, we should build common definitions, goals and indicators for monitoring implementation. It would also be useful to apply a network-based think-tank approach, as proposed by the European Policy Centre.

## **Key points from Working Group III in Session 3**

### **The Role of Civil Society in the Preparation of the Joint Strategy**

#### *Role of CSOs and their expectations:*

- It is the role and responsibility of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to convey information about the strategy, mobilize their constituents using existing networks and structures, and bring feedback back into the consultation process. (NB: Optimists within the group felt that this could be done before the Lisbon Summit while most others in the group felt that there is inadequate time to have an extensive grassroots consultation process in the timeframe.)
- CSOs to represent the people so that the State is not the only voice at the negotiating table.

#### *Threats / Challenges to CSOs*

- Lack of information of the impact of the strategy on the ground
- Legitimacy – who is Civil Society? How do we define it?
- Size of African continent; fragmentation of civil society
- Very short timeline before Lisbon Summit

#### *Opportunities for Civil Society*

- Engagement at this stage of strategy development gives CSOs the chance to define the mechanisms and manner in which civil society, in general, is engaged for the further development and implementation of the EU-Africa Strategy.
- Can expand the scope of the consultation to include more actors and all sectors – state, civil society, private sector, diaspora, local government, etc.

### **Implementation and monitoring of the future Joint Strategy: what place for Civil Society?**

- Inclusion of the private sector in planning and implementation is a contentious issue. There is suspicion of the motives of the business (profit-driven) sector, but they also have a significant role in supporting both economic development and civil society development (particularly in the use of technology to better facilitate civil society networking and engagement).

#### *Hopes for the EU-Africa Strategy*

- Strengthens civil society in general, but also develops new and strengthen existing civil society networks, at the regional and pan-African levels.
- Creation of framework for dialogue that goes beyond State structures / Parliaments
- Flexible mechanisms for continuous consultation through the development of strategy, monitoring, and review.

## **Key points from Working Group IV in Session 3**

### **Expectations**

- Sufficient time and information to enable all the constituencies to participate effectively
- There is need for guarantee or accountability, transparency and fairness in the process right from the design, monitoring and implementation of the process
- There is need for adequate space and resources to enable African CSOs to reflect on their own terms and chart their development agenda
- This platform should result to the building of a citizens movement between Africa and Europe in order to engage the EU processes in Africa
- The process needs to be as inclusive as possible and take into account all the thematic areas of different stakeholders including women and other vulnerable groups
- There is need for a feedback system between CSOs and institutions and that between the CSOs and their constituencies in drafting the strategy and their final implementation
- There is need for policy coherence
- There is need for the African CSOs to offer alternatives rather than just comment on the strategy
- Different timelines for the different institutions i.e. AU and EU in terms of policy formulation and implementation need to be harmonized in order to take into account the dialogue system right from the design and plan of projects to avoid the resultant extension of deadlines.
- There is need for the prevision of scope for intervention and there should be space and willingness on the part of the EU to take on board the views of the CSOs

### **Major differences in needs and expectations from the CSOs that need to be catered for**

- There are differences in the processes, contents and thematic areas in policies and strategies depending on the countries situations, locations, immigration requirements, institutional bureaucracies, capacities both human and capital, size and scale.
- But there is need for the CSOs to support and complement one another and the AU and EU need to make the process easy.
- There is need for inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral networkd that would provide a comprehensive approach to the entire strategy.
- Generally, the strategy has to take into account the differences that exist and provide scope and space for the different stakeholders in the African continent in order to have a comprehensive approach that is open and flexible.

### **Threats and Challenges**

- Too many concurrent debates and there is a fear that we are sidetracking on the main agenda and positions being made e.g. on EPAs, EDF, the G8 etc. Do we really need a Joint Strategy given that too many commitments made in the past for the development of Africa have not been met?
- The agenda is already set in advance together with the political and ideological goal of market-led growth and CSOs are just rubberstamping the entire process. This brings up the question of legitimacy and ownership of the entire strategy that may affect its future implementation.
- The issue of inclusion of all stakeholders including people with disability still remains a challenge and a strategy need to be put in place to enable information dissemination together with the resources for the involvement of a larger constituency
- Competition for resources from the donor community and the fight for supremacy among the CSOs may threaten their unity towards the Joint Strategy
- Lack of democracy and transparency at the AU level. For example the ECOSOCC is involved in a lot of side maneuvers and is more concerned with political elections rather than the real development challenges facing the continent.
- Inadequate financial and human resource capacity to engage the EU in the entire Joint Strategy process

## **Opportunities**

- Using the existing CSO thematic networks and global forums that already exist. For example the WSF, CONGO, FemNet, Africa Trade Network etc.
- Use this process to build a stronger CSO to engage with the European Development Policy on Africa.
- Mobilize a certain lobby to demand for accountability with the outside world on the basis of commitments earlier made
- There is an opportunity for the CSO to influence the draft strategy and so is it out and when is it available for review by the CSO?
- Globalization is an opportunity for the institutionalization of the EU-Africa relationship

## **Implementation and Monitoring of the future Joint Strategy:**

1. CSOs do not need to take the place of parliament but rather work with the parliaments in the member states. There is therefore need to reinforce the capacity of the Pan African Parliament in monitoring the Joint Strategy
2. Africans need to be given the space to structure the process and this does not happen in just three months. In view of the time limit there is need to explore other options for example: identify and prioritize key thematic areas for action, capture major political moments like the AU-EU, G8 Summits to amplify the necessary agendas.
3. Holding the EU accountable to the promises many years ago e.g. increasing the ODA, MDGs, Cotonou Agreement etc.
4. Need for real democracy in the EU
5. Is there an operation, monitoring and evaluation plan together with resources to ensure success of the Joint Strategy? Action plan need to have clear indicators and timeframes.
6. There is need for institutionalized participatory process in design, plan and evaluation of the entire Joint Strategy process with all the key stakeholders.

# Annex V – Guiding Questions for Day II Session 4: the Content of the Joint Strategy

## *Governance, Democracy and Human Rights*

### Context analysis

Governance is an important component of the EU-Africa dialogue, underpinned by various cooperation agreements (CPA , MEDA, TCDA) and by an expanding set of positive initiatives established by the Africa side (e.g. the APRM) or by the EU (e.g. the Governance Facility). Practice, however, suggests that the partnership on governance could be considerably improved. For instance, the EU-Africa dialogue on governance has tended to be hampered by a lack of a shared vision on dialogue priorities and modalities, leading to inconclusive talks (e.g. with regard to the return of cultural goods), a recurrent ownership deficit on the part of African partners; as well as major political blockages (e.g. on Zimbabwe). Furthermore, Europe is often perceived of pushing its own governance agendas, instruments and criteria rather than supporting (existing) African frameworks, developed at various levels. A growing amount of EU funding is available for governance, but its effective use raises a wide range of challenges (including on how to operate in non-democratic environments or in conflict countries). These concerns have been strongly voiced by civil society<sup>1</sup>, which claims that EU governance approach should be based on dialogue and mutual accountability. African civil society and local governments are also seeking to be more fully associated and heard on governance matters. Reciprocity is also a key issue, with the African side insisting on greater mutual accountability.

### Key questions

The current dialogue on a joint strategy provides an opportunity to consolidate the foundations of the EU-Africa partnership on governance by addressing the following issues:

#### **1. *Is there a shared vision on the strengths and weaknesses of current governance strategies and partnership approaches?***

A joint diagnosis provides a good starting point for the dialogue. It invites parties to briefly take stock of past experiences; to assess elements where progress has been made as well as shortcomings/gaps; and to identify key priorities that the new strategy should consider.

#### **2. *How can the dialogue on governance be improved?***

This may require a focus on guiding principles underpinning the dialogue; a refinement of existing mechanisms and modalities for setting the agenda and conducting the dialogue (including the follow-up into effective implementation); a search for more effective ways of organising a coherent dialogue with the various levels of governance (pan African, regional, national and local) as well as for ensuring a truly inclusive dialogue, which integrates the specific governance agendas of African peoples and organisations (e.g. civil society, political society, local governments)<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> See for instance: CIDSE. Governance and development cooperation: civil society perspectives on the European Union approach. August 2006. <http://www.cidse.org/docs/200608301145032995.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> The governance priorities of these actors do not necessarily coincide with official agendas. For an example see Vienna Declaration on the EU-Africa Strategy, elaborated by civil society organisations from

### **3. How to strengthen the primary responsibility of Africa in promoting governance?**

In order to improve ownership, effectiveness and impact, the joint strategy could clarify how Europe can help African institutions and actors to assume leadership on governance matters. This includes agreement on concrete actions Europe could take to support more effectively African governance policy frameworks (e.g. the AU Convention on preventing and combating corruption) institutions (e.g. AUC, the RECs, the envisaged Africa Governance Institute) and instruments (e.g. the APRM) up to the phase of implementation. It also invites parties to consider how Africa's primary responsibility for monitoring key governance processes (e.g. election observation<sup>3</sup>) could be ensured with adequate capacity development strategies and financial support over time.

### **4. How can the effectiveness of EU governance support be enhanced?**

This requires a joint analysis of lessons learnt with EU/EC governance support so far ('what has worked, what did not work and why?'). It invites parties to consider how the overall relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and potential impact of EU governance support could be improved. This, in turn, means refining current approaches to political dialogue; programming (at various levels); local capacity mobilisation on governance; modalities of engaging with civil society, political society and local governments; as well as mechanisms for downward accountability to African citizens.

### **5. How should performance on governance be assessed?**

Both parties insist that governance is a shared value underpinning the partnership relation. Yet in the absence of effective implementation strategies -allowing for fair and balanced performance review- there is a risk that governance will be perceived as a new externally imposed conditionality. In order to avoid this, it will be crucial to agree on a jointly owned framework to assess performance. The current dialogue could help to define such a framework, ideally based on the following principles: (i) a leadership role for the various African actors in setting the governance agenda; (ii) a multi-actor dialogue mechanism to agree upon relevant performance criteria; (iii) participatory and transparent mechanisms for monitoring governance progress; as well as (iv) reciprocity -so as to include an assessment of the governance performance of the various European actors in dealing with Africa.

### **6. How can mutual accountability be promoted?**

In order to ensure that governance yields the expected development benefits (e.g. in terms of achieving the MDGs) mutual accountability is crucial. Both parties agree on the principle, but the current dialogue could produce a major added value if it could spell out in greater detail the scope, content and operational modalities for translating the principle of 'mutual accountability' into practice<sup>4</sup>.

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both continents following a meeting on 23-24 June 2006 ([www.europafrica.org](http://www.europafrica.org)).

<sup>3</sup> The AU Commission has received an explicit mandate to assume a leadership role in election observation. It has developed concrete proposals to build its capacity in the field (including an Election Observation Fund). The joint strategy could help to clarify the optimal role division between the different parties and propose concrete measures to enable the AUC to effectively perform this role.

<sup>4</sup> This includes the respect for good governance principles in areas such as trade and economic cooperation, arms control, environment, etc. as well as in relatively new policy areas (migration; trafficking of human beings; intellectual property rights; illegal waste disposal, etc.).

## **Key Development Issues**

### **Context analysis**

African actors, both state and non-state, run development programmes at many different levels across the continent. Local and national level development programmes are perhaps the most evident but for several decades now there has been a recognition that regional and continental wide programmes also have a role to play. This view underpins the establishment of the RECs and is also one of the basic tenets of the African Union and NEPAD. Some of the continents development challenges, such as communicable diseases or migration, transcend national boundaries and need to be tackled on regional or continental basis. In other areas such as economic development, improving regional cooperation and building integrated infrastructure systems hold out the promise of more viable regional markets which should better stimulate growth and development. In other areas again, with problems that may need to be tackled on a more national basis, such as education or service provision, there are nevertheless still lessons to be learnt from one nation to the next. Development challenges therefore need to be tackled at all these different levels but in a coordinated and integrated way wherever possible.

The EU as a whole, that is Member States and the Community, are the biggest external supporters of development programmes in Africa. But EU aid is fragmented, unevenly distributed and managed in a multitude of different ways. The EC alone has three different frameworks for development cooperation with different parts of Africa. The EU has committed itself to increasing ODA levels and improving the effectiveness of its aid in line with the precepts of the Paris Declaration on harmonisation and alignment. But there are still question marks over whether it will actually achieve these goals. Improving aid effectiveness also implies improved dialogue with African governments on the best modalities and on how to improve alignment with African driven development programmes.

The Key Development Issues cluster includes a wide variety of topics from infrastructure, through socio-economic issues such as health, education and migration, to debt and financial issues. Some of these have a strongly political dimension as well as a development aspect. Each of them can provide scope for detailed discussions. It is useful therefore to agree on a generic framework for debating each of these subjects.

### **Key questions**

#### ***7. What is the state of the debate on the different topics in the 'key development issues' cluster?***

The first step in such a common framework would be to carry out a stock-taking exercise of what has been achieved in past discussions and identify where the obstacles are to further progress. On this basis further dialogue can then be built.

#### ***8. How to elevate the joint debate on each 'key development issue' to the level of a political dialogue beyond that of a simple discussion of development cooperation?***

Dialogue on development between African European actors has traditionally revolved around questions of how to move forward on cooperation and European support to Africa efforts. The preparation of this joint strategy however offers a unique opportunity to move beyond such a basic level and recognise the value of opening up a genuine political dialogue between Africa and Europe in each of these areas. On some issues, for instance migration, such an AU-EU political dialogue is already engaged, in others, such as environment and climate change, the potential is evident, but further steps could be taken to engage a dialogue on how actors in the two continents could work together to confront such challenges.

**9. How can the current fragmentation of EU support (EC and Member States bilateral programmes) to African development programmes be improved?**

The joint strategy could sketch out an agreed line of action to take towards improving the overall consistency of EU support to development programmes at all levels in Africa. This could cover such issues as the uneven distribution of EU support across the continent and the need to avoid disparities between 'aid orphans' and 'aid darlings'. It could equally discuss the best ways of ensuring consistency between the different EC support programmes to Africa: the Cotonou Agreement, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the TDCA between the EU and South Africa. At another level the joint strategy could spell out an agreed approach on improved integration between the EU support programmes to different levels of development work in Africa from the local and national levels right up to the regional and continental level of NEPAD.

**10. How to strengthen the primary responsibility of Africa in devising and leading on development programmes?**

In order to improve ownership, effectiveness and impact, the joint strategy could clarify how Europe can help African institutions and actors to consolidate further their leadership on all development programmes. Clarifying points of view and agreeing on the best approaches towards alignment or the use of specific aid modalities such as general budget support could well prove useful. The implications of the principle of increasing African ownership should then be explored in greater detail in each 'key development issue'.

**11. How can the effectiveness of EU development cooperation be enhanced and the governance of aid improved?**

The Paris Declaration on the effectiveness of aid has been agreed by EU member states and the European Commission as well as a number of African states. This includes important points on the timely, cost effective and transparent administration of development resources. The preparation of this joint strategy provides a good opportunity to consider how these principles can best be put into practice as far as EU cooperation with Africa is concerned and in each area or sector of development.

**12. How to ensure the delivery of commitments and the monitoring of progress achieved?**

Any healthy partnership recognises the importance of each party reporting on progress made on delivering on their respective commitments. To this end, agreed monitoring and review systems need to be established from the start, so as to ensure information on results is available as and when required and in a form that enables performance assessments to be carried out according to agreed modalities. The preparation of this joint strategy is an ideal opportunity to establish such agreements and ensure all parties are satisfied with the systems set in place.

One key area where Africans will be interested in monitoring progress is in the achievement of donor commitments to increasing ODA levels to meet the 0,7% of GNI target by 2015. The EU has clearly committed itself to this goal in its own Strategy for Africa<sup>5</sup>. A joint Africa-Europe partnership strategy could usefully set out a common understanding of how this goal is to be achieved in practical terms and how performance is to be measured.

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<sup>5</sup> European development NGOs have underlined the high proportion of debt relief in the EU ODA increase stressing that debt relief does not represent new resources for developing countries. It has called for a revision of ODA criteria. See CONCORD press release : [http://www.concordeurope.org/Files/media/internetdocumentsFRE/1\\_Accueil/1\\_3\\_nouveauxdoc/PressreleasechiffresAPD2006FR.doc](http://www.concordeurope.org/Files/media/internetdocumentsFRE/1_Accueil/1_3_nouveauxdoc/PressreleasechiffresAPD2006FR.doc)

## ***Trade and Regional Integration***

### **Context analysis**

Both the EU and Africa have put trade and regional integration at the heart of their development strategy. However, diverging views seem to exist between Europe and Africa as to whether the proposed trade arrangements, particularly the Economic Partnership Agreements-EPAs, will deliver on their development objectives and the MDGs. The African/ACP side in the partnership has repeatedly expressed concern that EPAs, as conceived now, could undermine the delicate regional integration processes in the various African sub-regions as well as pan African integration. Both African and European civil society has voiced very strong concerns on the process leading to EPAs negotiations and their content, notably through the Stop EPA campaign<sup>6</sup>. Furthermore, African countries feel that not enough attention has been given to concrete actions aimed at addressing supply-side constraints and supporting their industrialisation efforts, as well as building effective regional markets and thereby Africa's capacity to produce, diversify and export. Last but not least, while participation has been strongly advocated for in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, it appears that the EPA process suffers from a lack of ownership by ACP governmental and key economic and social actors such as agricultural producers and private sector operators. There is now increasing pressure on the various African sub-regions involved in the EPA negotiations to respect the deadline of 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2007 for the conclusion of EPAs. The proposed dialogue on a renewed partnership between Europe and Africa offers an opportunity to openly address unresolved concerns on EPA related issues and to consider alternative strategies to fully integrate trade in a developmental perspective. .

### **Key Questions**

#### ***1 Stock-taking: what assessment can be made of current and future trade arrangements between the EU and Africa?***

This is the first step to take on the way to a shared vision on how trade issues should be dealt with in the proposed joint strategy. It invites parties to take stock of strengths and weaknesses of ACP-EU (Lomé and EPAs), EU-MED and EU-South Africa trade arrangements, as well as the EBA and GSP schemes. Such a diagnosis could help to jointly identify the building blocks of a more solid, African owned and development-oriented trade partnership in the coming years.

#### ***2 Value added: what is the potential value-added of a joint EU-Africa Strategy on trade and regional integration as compared with the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the MEDA agreement and the TDCA?***

To what extent can a Joint EU-Africa Strategy on trade and regional integration be any different from the existing partnerships and future trade arrangements i.e. MEDA, EPAs, TDCA? How to ensure coherence between the EU-Africa Strategy on trade and regional integration and other trade initiatives? What needs to be done to ensure that the joint EU-Africa strategy (i) contributes to ensuring that Africa takes better advantage of multilateral settings (e.g. WTO and/or other international organisations; (ii) provides the basis for greater coherence between processes discussed at the multilateral level, such as the Doha negotiations and EU trading arrangements with Africa; (iii) facilitates enhanced coordination at pan-African level among the various regional integration and EPA processes.

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<sup>6</sup> See for instance [www.stopepa.org](http://www.stopepa.org). A day of action against EPAs has also been organised last week in African, Caribbean, Pacific and European regions, see <http://epa2007.org>.

**3 *Process of EPAs: How can the fundamental divergences between the EU and Africa/ACP on the development aspects of EPAs be bridged, in particular with respect to development support to EPAs? How can the joint EU-Africa Strategy help in solving this issue?***

Throughout the negotiating process for EPAs (2002-2007), confusion seems to exist as to how the ultimate development goals of EPAs will be achieved. In the past years, several African stakeholders have expressed concern that ACP-EU negotiations for EPAs do not sufficiently address trade and development objectives. While the EC is focussing on trade liberalisation and related rules, the ACP are calling for the latter to be linked to binding development support for capacity building, at both the negotiating and implementation levels of EPAs. What guarantees can the EC and EU member states give to the African side of the partnership that development support will be given the necessary attention? Can the EC mandate be changed accordingly and are EU Member States prepared to do so? Do EPAs and other trade agreements with the EU actually stimulate regional integration processes in Africa or do they rather undermine regional and pan-African integration? How can the EU respond in a positive way to these African concerns so as to ensure African full ownership and flexibility of the process? Are there any realistic alternatives to EPAs that could be considered by Africa?

**4 *Governance of trade: how to ensure the governance dimension in trade, both in terms of the process and implementation of any new trade arrangements?***

The way in which trade negotiations between the EU and Africa/ACP are conducted has been critically assessed by various African actors (including civil society organisations). The perception exists that an asymmetric partnership prevails, characterised by 'top-down approaches', with the related risk of 'pushing through' trade deals that are not genuinely shared or that lack the flexibility to make them work to the benefit of Africa. To what extent do parties agree that the 'governance' of the trade partnership could be improved in terms of process and outcome? If so, how can the joint EU-Africa Strategy effectively address the linkages between trade, development and governance? How can the trade dialogue between the EU and Africa be improved so as to better incorporate Africa's development needs as well as fostering true ownership? How to better involve the private sector both in the negotiating and implementation process of EPAs?

**5 *Actors: who would be the key interlocutors on the African side on trade issues? How to ensure complementarity between the AU, the RECs, Member States and Non State actors?***

In addressing this question it would be important to assess the roles to be played by different categories of actors in support of trade in the EU- Africa partnership. For instance, is there a need to reconsider the roles played by the AUC in support of the various regional integration and EPA negotiations processes in Africa? How can the AU take a more prominent role and responsibility in this respect? What is the potential value added and complementarity of the AUC in relation to the RECs and the ACP institutions? How to ensure that economic and social actors, including the private sector , agricultural producers and trade unions also play their roles in trade? Through what processes can this be fostered?

**6 *Monitoring: how to monitor the implementation of the EU-Africa trade arrangements and ensure transparency and accountability in the process?***

This question aims to identify the type of joint monitoring mechanisms that should ideally ensure underpin the EU-Africa partnership on trade and economic cooperation. Attempts were made to put in place such a joint system, but without much impact so far. To what extent do 'development benchmarks' approaches provide a good tool to assess the outcomes of the

negotiation and implementation of trade agreements? How can monitoring mechanisms ensure that the benefits of a Europe-Africa partnership on trade and regional integration are distributed in an equitable and sustainable way? How to make these mechanisms operational, functional and participatory?

**7 EU Support: how can the EU most effectively support regional integration and trade in Africa? Where to put priorities in the use of aid for trade? What are the most urgent priorities in terms of capacity building and institutional development so as to ensure that African countries can benefit from trade with Europe?**

In addressing this set of questions, it would be important to look into the various instruments and procedures for effective and timely delivery of EU aid to African institutions, private sector actors and other stakeholders involved in trade. Through which channels should EU support best be delivered (at the level of the African Union institutions, the Regional Economic Communities, the EPA configuration, the NEPAD, national states, economic and social actor?) How to ensure effective trade support in a long term perspective?

## ***Peace and Security***

### **Context Analysis**

Peace, security and development are common interests and shared goals in relations between the EU and the AU and African partners in general. Both European and African actors acknowledge the close link between security and development. Since its creation in 2002 the AU has quickly established itself as the prime actor in peace and security affairs across the continent and the EU has been keen to support it in achieving this end. Working closely with the five designated RECs the AU expects to continue to build up the African 'peace & security architecture' over the next few years. The EU has been stepping up efforts to develop a common policy framework to strengthen coherence and coordination of policies, resources and instruments at the EU level (including with member states) to better respond to the evolving African needs.

Concerns have been voiced by African and European civil society regarding the predictability and availability of funding and the fact that development funding should not be used to support security related activities. The EU is perceived by many NGOs as putting great emphasis in building AU's capacity to respond to crisis situations and short-term conflict resolution, and not enough in conflict prevention (namely early warning, mediation, political dialogue, justice). The issue of coherence of EU policies (namely of trade, but also energy policies), that should be come more 'conflict sensitive' has also been raised<sup>7</sup>.

Despite the progress in this rather recent area of cooperation between the EU and the AU and African regional organizations, various key questions thus need to be addressed by all players, both on the European and the African side, if further progress and sustainable capacity in the planned African peace and security architecture (APSA) is to be properly consolidated and enduring results achieved.

### **Key questions**

The current dialogue on a joint strategy provides an opportunity to develop and consolidate the rather recent EU-Africa partnership on peace and security by addressing the following issues:

#### ***1. What are the current key challenges in bringing peace and security to the African continent?***

This entails not only identifying the key challenges to peace and security in Africa, but also clarifying whether the EU and the AU share a common vision and understanding of what these key challenges are; in what specific areas and stages of the conflict cycle from prevention to conflict resolution and post-conflict stabilization should cooperation be developed; and addressing in broad terms how this can and should this be done.

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<sup>7</sup> <http://www.eplo.org/documents/EU-Africa%20Comments%2017-April-07.doc>  
[http://www.prospects-for-africa.de/fileadmin/user\\_upload/downloads/Dokumente\\_VENRO/Manifest\\_Internet-e.pdf](http://www.prospects-for-africa.de/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/Dokumente_VENRO/Manifest_Internet-e.pdf)  
<http://www.eucoherence.org/renderer.do/menuld/227304/clearState/true/sf/227364/returnPage/227364/itEmlId/239895/realltemId/239895/pageId/227351/instanceId/227393/>

**2. *What is the added-value of a joint EU-Africa Strategy comprising peace and security issues?***

EU collaboration with African states on peace and security is already covered by the existing MEDA, Cotonou and TDCA agreements. What specific features could a joint EU-Africa Strategy usefully add to these agreements? Possible areas of improvement include (i) strengthening complementarity with regional and international efforts to promote peace and security in Africa; (ii) developing more comprehensive joint EU-Africa strategies for moving beyond peacekeeping into addressing the need of post-conflict reconstruction (e.g. DDR, SSR, linking relief, rehabilitation and development) and (iii) further clarifying the role division between the various European institutional actors (at the level of the EC, the EU Council, the Member States).

**3. *How best to strengthen and support the AU in its efforts to develop the African peace and security architecture?***

In addressing this question, it would be important to take stock of the specific partnership relation between the EU and the AU cooperation so far in the area of P&S, identify both parties' advantages and constraints to fully and effectively address peace and security issues in Africa, and what is needed by both the EU and the AU and REC's to build long-term capacity while supporting at the same time immediate needs to manage and resolve conflicts in Africa. It invites parties to consider whether current approaches are consistent with the proclaimed EU objectives and core principles of the EU-Africa partnership? Do they form a sufficiently coordinated and consistent package or are there still inconsistencies that need to be addressed to increase the effectiveness of the support?

On the African side, some outstanding issues are: the institutional development of the AU and RECs and their long-term capacity needs. Another important issue relates to the best use of the principle of subsidiarity in the APSA: which of the identified key challenges can best be dealt at the AU, RECs or national, or even at local level;

On the EU side outstanding issues include: the effectiveness of EU support in building African long-term capacity; the best way to collaborate with the AU and the RECs to address identified constraints; coherence of EU policies and coordination with MS; the need to create flexible and sustainable financial instruments.

**4. *What is the EU's added-value for the AU, relative to international partner in helping Africans address peace and security issues on their continent?***

The AU and RECs also work closely with and seek support on P&S issues from other international partners such as the UN, NATO and bilateral partners like the US and China. What is the specific added value of working with the EU and are there ways this collaboration could further emphasise these strong points? Although the EU is clearly an important partner, dealing with the EU institutions is not always an easy task for various reasons, such as its complex decision making processes or grant procedures. The APF has been a welcome tool for the AU but it could be further improved and some EU member states remain ambiguous about the way it has had to be funded. What are the main bottle-necks and disadvantages of having the EU as a partner when dealing with peace and security issues in Africa and how could these be overcome in a constructive fashion?

## Annex VI - Reports from Day II Session 4: the Content of the Joint Strategy

### *Key points from the Thematic Working Group on Governance, Democracy and Human Rights*

Main points raised during the Working Group:

- There should not be a standard model of governance to be applied everywhere and imposed from outside. Each country has its own definition according to its culture, tradition and history. Donors, including the EC, should respect and work on the partner country's own governance agenda that should come from the base (bottom-up approach)
- The principle of mutual accountability should be applied: not only should Africa be accountable to Europe (based on negotiated and not imposed criteria), but the latter also should be accountable to Africa in terms of more effective aid, ensuring coherence with its other policies (mainly trade), better coordination between the EC and the member states, etc.
- There is a gap between the theories and practices of governance, such as the EC's double standards (ex: the norms applied to Zimbabwe should not be different from those applied to China) and the unbalanced partnership on governance: the EC, being the donor, has the power to impose 'its governance' to Africa, the recipient.
- Given its incapacity to provide basic services (education, health, etc.) to the population, the central state is not longer perceived as legitimate. There is a large consensus in promoting local governance and accountability to the citizen (downward accountability) through civil society, local authorities, parliament, women's organisations, youth organisations and the media. These institutions and grassroots should be empowered and strengthened for an effective accountability.
- Need to make people part of political dialogue and go beyond the formal dialogue to achieve a multi-actor dialogue that includes parliaments, civil society, local governments, women, youth, marginalised groups, etc. What kind of mechanism to have such dialogue?
- The APRM is a good and valuable mechanism, but what next? What type of enforcement process to ensure that the conclusion can be implemented? Civil society should be involved in such a process.
- We should talk not only about political governance, but also about economic governance. The central state should be able to respond to the economic and social needs of the population. The question is also how to create richness in order to come out of poverty.
- Importance of civic education, citizenship in practice and youth organisations to make sure that young people, who will be the future actors, behave like good citizens and are able to talk about governance.

- Governance profile: there are 9 evaluation criteria of governance to allocate additional funds. Some are related to trade liberalisation, migration, the fight against terrorism, etc. These governance criteria do not necessarily coincide with those of African people and civil society, which were not involved in the negotiation.
- There is a plethora of definitions of governance. How to put in place a mechanism to define governance? Who should be involved in such mechanism?
- There is a new approach of governance in Africa. In order to make its support to governance effective, the EC has to change its structural organisation and practice (ex: budget support) to be able to integrate such new approach. European civil society should help push for such change.

## ***Key points from the Thematic Working Group on Key Development Issues***

### **Introduction and Methodology:**

This workshop included a range of Civil Society Actors who were prepared to discuss and exchange ideas on 'Key Development Issues'; but not mandated by their organizations to conclude with specific recommendations. The workshop methodology consisted of a brainstorming of key themes, followed by a two part structured discussion. It was agreed that during such a short session, it would not be possible to explore all the important themes in depth; therefore it would be essential to point out that further in-depth Civil Society debate on these key strategic issues is needed.

Members of the group made initial introductions during which they mentioned the key development issues they wished to discuss. At this point it became clear that the group were concerned with **certain specific 'key' issues in development**, but also **in fundamental ideological principles underpinning development**. This led to a decision to divide the discussions of the workshop into two parts:

- Part 1 would be a session discussing fundamental principles which underpin development which the whole group agreed with. It was felt that this discussion of principles was the most important section of the workshop.
- Part 2 involved debate on specific key issues in development. These areas were defined as follows:

- A. ODA quantity and quality and debt
- B. Human and social development; health and education for all; vulnerable or excluded groups; HIV and AIDs and the MDGs
- C. Environmental sustainability, energy and climate change
- D. Migration
- E. Agriculture

### **Outputs of part 1**

#### **Fundamental principles:**

The group was in agreement that the following principles need to be adhered to in the proposed Joint EU Africa Strategy (the Strategy), which should center on development. These principles are already enshrined in our current international commitments.

1. **The neoliberal model of development should not be imposed on countries.**
2. The strategy under discussion should be based on the **African reality**; poverty is still critical, we are far from reaching the MDGs.
3. Equality and in particular **gender equality** should be considered as cross-cutting in all areas of the Strategy.

4. Development must be **people-focused and pro-poor**.
5. Human **rights** and the right to development should be central to our approach. This also cuts across areas of Governance and Peace and security.
6. The principle of **justice** is linked with a human rights approach ( - economic justice, environmental justice, trade, etc)
7. Commitments from the **Paris declaration on Aid Effectiveness** should be met; in particular ownership of national governments, local authorities, and civil society, including grass roots actors and organizations.
8. **Human security** is an essential prerequisite to development. This includes food security, physical security, and environmental security.
9. There needs to be policy space for African governments and for Civil Society to come to their own positions on the relationship between the EU and Africa.
10. **Civil society and local government capacity** needs to be reinforced in order to guarantee sustainable development.

#### Outputs from Part 2 - Key Development Issues

- A. ODA quantity and quality and debt
- B. Human and social development; health and education for all; vulnerable or excluded groups; HIV and AIDs and the MDGs
- C. Environmental sustainability, energy and climate change
- D. Migration
- E. Agriculture

It was felt that all these topics required additional in-depth reflection and shared positioning by a broader and more representative group of civil society. The following is an attempt to summarise the key points of the discussions held so far.

#### A ODA quantity and quality and debt

##### Debt

1. Debt, and debt cancellation must remain a key issue in political dialogue
2. Debt undermines all efforts African governments are making in the field of human development and the MDGs
3. An audit of current debt should be undertaken in order to clarify what present national debts are illegitimate
4. Debt cancellation is essential to development, but should not be counted as ODA

## ODA

1. Design and delivery of ODA should include the most important stakeholders; it should be based on ownership by African States and people
2. European governments need to meet their current commitments to ODA quantity and quality
3. These commitments should be met through genuine aid- additional transfers of new resources from Europe to African countries
4. European countries should not inflate their ODA
5. The commitments of the Paris Declaration need to be applied; in particular with regard to ownership, alignment, mutual accountability and national scrutiny
6. With increased budget support, there is a need for increased scrutiny of aid especially within the recipient countries. In particular indicators for human and social development, for gender budgeting and for education and health should be established. Civil society capacity for scrutiny of budget support processes should be enforced. Otherwise there is the danger that basic social services such as education and health will be seriously under-resourced.
7. New innovative mechanisms for financing development should be committed to. This requires serious political will; the mechanisms are there, tried and tested. There must be an exploration of other mechanisms such as trust funds and carbon trading. However, these new mechanisms must be addition to the aid commitments that our governments have already made.

## **B Human and social development; health and education for all; vulnerable or excluded groups; HIV and AIDs and the MDGs**

1. This is considered to be a crucial area and most under threat by the neoliberal development model. The economic policy conditionalities imposed on poor countries by the IFIs and the wider donor community are acting as a serious barrier to effective investment in basic social services.
2. High levels of debt also contribute to undermining African countries efforts to ensure that this area receives sufficient resources.
3. **Education for all** is crucial to the empowerment of all people. Without access to education, gender equality cannot be realized. Without attention to early childhood education and universal primary education, poverty cannot be addressed. In particular education for all must include specific effort to reach the children most often out of school- girl children, children with disabilities, children from poor communities.

4. **Health for all** is central to equality, and in particular gender equality. There needs to be significant investment in health systems, and support for African Government initiatives.
5. **HIV and AIDs** undermines human development and therefore cuts across all areas of human development. Serious commitment to resource the fight against HIV/AIDS is needed to achieve the goals of universal access.
6. **Current international commitments** on education for all and health for all need to be integrated in the Strategy.
7. In relation to all our work on human and social development it must be ensured that **the rights of the most excluded or vulnerable groups** in society are addressed; if development is to be pro-poor and people-focused; specific attention needs to be paid to ensure that the rights women, children, person with disabilities, the elderly are given prominence in the Strategy.
8. **Human resources for health and education** systems are in crisis. European governments must address their own role in contributing to the brain drain by recruiting health and education professionals from Africa
9. **the right of access to basic social services** needs to be incorporated into the EU Africa Strategy; privatization of social services often adversely affects the poor, and women.
10. **Sustainable decent employment** must be recognized as essential prerequisite to development.

## **C Environmental sustainability, energy and climate change**

The discussion in this area covered two broad areas- Europe's responsibilities and people and the environment.

### Europe's responsibilities

Europe, including States, investors and business actors needs to recognize its responsibility for

1. Climate change
2. trade in and use of natural resources
3. polluting industries
4. export of waste

Because of Europe's responsibilities in these areas, a partnership between Europe and Africa needs to include

1. Additional funding for environmental adaptation (climate change adaptation to be funded from additional funds and not out of ODA).
2. Respect for international environmental agreements

### People and the environment:

There needs to be transparent discussions regarding the use of natural resources, as well as participation and access to decision making by local authorities, civil society, and citizens, where natural resources are being sold off, or used unsustainably. These include fisheries, forest and water. This is a governance issue, and is crucially related to the principles of justice and civil society empowerment which should underpin development efforts.

There needs to be a systematic analysis of the relationship between:

- environmental degradation, poverty, inequality, gender and health;
- environmental degradation and migration.

The results of such analysis need to be incorporated in the Strategy.

Poor communities are most affected by environmental degradation and women disproportionately bear the consequences. There is a silent crisis in access to energy resources- wood, oil and hydroelectric power are all under threat. Lack of access to energy will undermine all human development, including vital issues such as food security and health.

Protection of people and environments needs to be included in this strategy, in particular farmers, fishers and forestry workers.

## **D Migration**

1. Migration is a shared responsibility of Africa and Europe.
2. Civil society has not been adequately consulted on the issue of migration; further debate is needed on the following issues:
  - Article 13 of the Cotonou agreement
  - The concept of co-development<sup>8</sup>
  - Management of migration flows
  - Integration of migrants into their recipient countries, whether in Europe or Africa
  - Marginalization of migrants into their recipient countries, whether in Europe or Africa
  - The relationship of migrants with their home countries/ countries of origin and the imperative to involve the Diaspora in development
  - International treaties on the rights of migrants and on trafficking need to be ratified and incorporated into the Strategy.
3. Limiting migration should not be considered as either a condition for aid or as a development strategy.

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<sup>8</sup> Co-development is a concept that aims to engage migrants in their host countries development cooperation, building on their experiences and contacts with their countries of origin.

## **E      Agriculture**

African Governments need to meet their commitments in terms of support to the **agricultural sector**, which is crucial to human and social development, and food security.

## **Key points from the Thematic Working Group on Trade and Regional Integration**

The group on trade and regional integration identified three crucial questions that need to be addressed in the Joint EU-Africa Strategy:

- i) What can the Joint EU-Africa Strategy do to improve on trade and regional integration?
- ii) How is coherence ensured between the EU-Africa Strategy and other EU and African trade initiatives and policies?
- iii) What are the clear obligations and commitments of both the EU and the AU in the implementation of the Joint Strategy?

From the discussions, the chair identified the following headings for the chapter on Trade and Regional integration and where the issues raised by participants to the working group could feature:

### **Core principles: interaction and values**

- This chapter should establish the *rationale* of the value addition of the EU-Africa Joint Strategy on trade and regional integration and its intended *effect*.  
For instance, will it be another political document? Will it serve as a tool for coordinating the existing EU and African trade policies and regional integration strategies? Will it be a legally binding document (with a dispute settlement mechanism)? Will it have a programmatic outcome?
- It should be explicitly recognized that trade and regional integration are means towards the broader objective of development.
- The Joint Strategy should recognize the asymmetrical differences between Europe and Africa.
- The chapter on Trade and Regional integration should be clearly linked and integrated with other chapters of the Strategy (Key development issues, governance and security).
- Ownership should be ensured through civil society involvement.

### **Linking and integrating trade to development and other productive capacities issues.**

- The Strategy should not only commit to create better market access for African producers but also to enhance the productive capacity of African countries.
- The role of SMEs, particularly the informal and the agricultural sector and small farmers, for development should be recognized and supported, and the conditions for their enterprise development improved with a view to ensuring a fair trading system.

### **Creation of a policy dialogue platform**

- More generally, the EU should commit to consult/inform on all policies affecting Africa.
- The Strategy should serve to create a continuous dialogue platform between the EU and Africa to discuss sequencing of policies and new issues.

### **Commitment to the Abuja Treaty and the African vision for Africa**

- The EU-Africa Joint Strategy should respect and support Africa's own integration strategy, i.e through the Abuja Treaty Process.
- Africa needs to develop its own Trade and Regional Integration Strategy and should be allowed to integrate first.
- The role of the AU in EPAs needs to be more clearly defined and visible.
- The role of the existing regional economic communities in the Strategy should be clearly defined.

### **Coherence of the AU/EU policies**

- The Joint Strategy should go beyond the fragmented policies towards and affecting the

African continent and contribute to creating coherence and cohesion.

- The Strategy should in particular address EU agricultural policies and its effects on Africa, including its coherence with trade policies.

**Articulation of the trade negotiations agendas**

- The strategy should serve to harmonize the EU trade agreements with Africa (EPAs, TDCA, MEDA) and should promote regional integration between North and Sub-Saharan Africa.

## ***Key points from the Thematic Working Group on Peace and Security***

### **❖ Principles**

- Take a holistic view of development.
- Do not separate the thinking on development with peace and security.
- Human security doctrine to be the basis for AU EU relations.

### **❖ Capacity Building**

- Capacity building should reinforce existing structures within the EU and AU with particular emphasis on civilian capabilities in peace and security. It is important that conflict prevention and peace building activities be carried out by professional permanent staff. This capacity building is applicable to both parties.
- Enhance the role of CSOs and other actors in conflict prevention and peace building.
- Women to be involved in peace building initiatives.
- The role of the media is important in peace building and conflict.

### **❖ Funding Mechanism**

- Need for predictable, flexible and easily accessible funds for African Civil Society in addition to development money there should be a separate support for peacekeeping.
- Conditionality and accountability are usually very cumbersome. They need to be relaxed.
- Funds for development not to be diverted to peace building. There should be a separate budget for peace building.

### **❖ Structure/ mechanism for conflict prevention and peace building**

- On- going dialogue with civil society on peace and security is essential and specific structures and mechanisms should be enshrined in the strategy particularly with regard to early warning and early action.
- Peace and Security, based on principles of human security requires a holistic approach encompassing crisis management, long term peace- building, development, conflict prevention and governance.

### **❖ Coherent EU Policy**

- Institutional coherence.
- Provision of resource to address small arms and light weapons (SALW) and mines.
- Role of the private sector in conflict should be an object of focus.

- Conflict sensitive policies to be put place.
- The role of private military and security companies should not be overlooked

Ongoing dialogue with civil society on peace and security is essential and specific structures and mechanisms should be enshrined in the Strategy, particularly with regard to early warning and early action.

❖ **Global Issues**

- The role of climate change in potentially fuelling conflict should be considered.